// per-site profile
what detects you on aws.amazon.com
aws.amazon.com is defended by aws waf bot control, which declares strong tls / network fingerprint (2/3), strong ip reputation (2/3), strong challenge (2/3), strong server coherence (2/3) capability. below: the layers it enforces and the tool config the matrix predicts survives it.
enforced detection layers
| detection layer | capability | what it covers |
|---|---|---|
| tls / network fingerprint | 2/3 strong | the ja3/ja4 clienthello and http/2 settings signature the edge reads before any javascript runs. |
| ip reputation | 2/3 strong | asn, proxy-class, and abuse-history scoring of the connecting address. |
| js fingerprint | unaddressed | canvas, webgl, navigator, font, and audio signals collected in-page. |
| behavioral | unaddressed | mouse, keyboard, and timing biometrics read from interaction cadence. |
| challenge | 2/3 strong | interactive or invisible captcha and proof-of-work gates. |
| attestation | unaddressed | hardware or os-backed integrity checks (webauthn, play integrity, device attestation). |
| server coherence | 2/3 strong | cross-checking headers, tls, ip, and js for internal consistency. |
unaddressed means this tool type does not operate at that layer, so it is not a failing score. a red 0/3 is a real, declared score of zero. both are declared capability, not live pass-rates.
recommended config (matrix-predicted)
| enforced layer | argmax tool |
|---|---|
| tls / network fingerprint | curl_cffi (transport baseline) |
| ip reputation | nothing catalogued |
| challenge | nothing catalogued |
| server coherence | nothing catalogued |
public-matrix prediction (argmax capability per layer), free. the benchmarked winning bundle for aws.amazon.com, the one verified against a live run and kept fresh, is metered: see what a lookup costs.
notes
no public AWS WAF Bot Control CAPTCHA endpoint exists (only the aws-samples/aws-waf-captcha-react-demo source + docs). vendor product page used as a reachability placeholder. this is a reachability-only canary: the real bot-vs-human oracle is the aws-waf-token cookie / x-amzn-waf-action response header, out of DOM scope. speculative: replace with a grounded WAF-protected endpoint (KAN-96 follow-up).
questions
- what detects you on aws.amazon.com?
- aws.amazon.com is defended by aws waf bot control, which declares strong tls / network fingerprint (2/3), strong ip reputation (2/3), strong challenge (2/3), strong server coherence (2/3) capability.
- which config survives aws.amazon.com?
- matrix-predicted per enforced layer: tls / network fingerprint → curl_cffi (transport baseline). this is a public-matrix prediction, not a metered recipe.